What problems does the constitution solve that the articles of confederation was susceptible to
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journal article Show Stanford Law Review Vol. 63, No. 1 (DECEMBER 2010) , pp. 115-185 (71 pages) Published By: Stanford Law Review https://www.jstor.org/stable/41105396 Read and download Log in through your school or library Read Online (Free) relies on page scans, which are not currently available to screen readers. To access this article, please contact JSTOR User Support. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.With a personal account, you can read up to 100 articles each month for free. Already have an account? Log in Monthly Plan
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Abstract The Framers of the United States Constitution wrote Article I, Section 8 in order to address some daunting collective action problems facing the young nation. They especially wanted to protect the states from military warfare by foreigners and from commercial warfare against one another. The states acted individually when they needed to act collectively, and Congress lacked power under the Articles of Confederation to address these problems. Section 8 thus authorized Congress to promote the "general Welfare" of the United States by tackling many collective action problems that the states could not solve on their own. Subsequent interpretations of Section 8, both outside and inside the courts, often have focused on the presence or absence of collective action problems involving multiple states—but not always. For example, the Supreme Court of the United States, in trying to distinguish the "truly national" from the "truly local" in the context of the Commerce Clause, United States v. Morrisoa 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000), has differentiated "economic" activity, which Congress may regulate, from "noneconomic" activity, which Congress may not regulate. A federal constitution ideally gives the central and state governments the power to do what each does best. But economic activity does not generally cause collective action problems among the states, and noneconomic activity is not generally free from collective action problems. Consequently, Congress is not generally better at regulating economic activity, and the states are not generally better at regulating noneconomic activity. The distinction between economic and noneconomic activity seems mostly irrelevant to the problems of federalism. We propose a better foundation for American federalism in Section 8. Our theory distinguishes activities that pose collective action problems from those that do not. This approach flows directly from the relative advantages of the federal government and the states. We show that Section 8 mostly concerns collective action problems created by interstate externalities and national markets. We conclude that Section 8 authorizes Congress to tax, spend, and regulate to solve these collective action problems. Collective action federalism finds that the limits and expanse of congressional power in Section 8 turn on the difference between individual and collective action by the states. The theory uses this distinction to differentiate interstate commerce from intrastate commerce, not the economic/noneconomic distinction. Our distinction best explains why Congress may not ordinarily use its commerce power to regulate such crimes as assault or gun possession in schools. Collective action federalism also identifies a constitutional "hook" for Congress to regulate multi-state problems of collective action that may not involve commerce: Clause I of Section 8 authorizes some forms of regulation of noneconomic harms that spill over state boundaries, such as contagious diseases and certain kinds of environmental pollution. Journal Information Founded in 1948, the Stanford Law Review is a general-interest academic legal journal. Each year the Law Review publishes one volume, which appears in six separate issues between November and May. Each issue contains material written by student members of the Law Review, other Stanford law students, and outside contributors, such as law professors, judges, and practicing lawyers. Approximately 2,600 libraries, attorneys, judges, law firms, government agencies, and others subscribe to the Law Review. The Law Review also hosts lectures and an annual live symposium at Stanford Law School. Publisher Information The Stanford Law Review is operated entirely by Stanford Law School students and is fully independent of faculty and administration review or supervision. The principal missions of the Law Review are to contribute to legal scholarship by addressing important legal and social issues, and to educate and foster intellectual discourse at Stanford Law School. In addition to producing a publication, the Law Review also hosts lectures and an annual live symposium. Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR Collection. What problems did the Constitution solve from the Articles of Confederation?One of the most significant changes between the Articles of Confederation and Constitution was the creation of the three branches of government: the executive, legislative, and judicial. This separation of powers ensured that power would not be concentrated in one particular branch.
What are 3 major problems with the Articles of Confederation?Specifically, the lack of a strong national government in the Articles of Confederation led to three broad limitations.. Economic disorganization.. Lack of central leadership.. Legislative inefficiencies.. What were the 4 major problems of the Articles of Confederation?These included:. Each state only had one vote in Congress, regardless of size.. Congress did not have the power to tax.. Congress did not have the power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce.. There was no executive branch to enforce any acts passed by Congress.. There was no national court system or judicial branch.. What was one main problem with the Articles of Confederation?One of the biggest problems was that the national government had no power to impose taxes. To avoid any perception of “taxation without representation,” the Articles of Confederation allowed only state governments to levy taxes. To pay for its expenses, the national government had to request money from the states.
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